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When, nearly ten years ago, I first started studying philosophy, I remember asking one of my tutors over lunch what philosophy was actually all 
about. “Imagine,” he said referring to the table in front of him, “that this table 
had no legs.” “I am imagining,” I said. “Good. Imagine now that it had no surface 
and no sides.” 
I looked hungrily at the dishes on the table - at which point, my professor, 
rather uncharitably said, “Imagine now that there was nothing on the surface. 
What remains?” 
“Nothing,” I replied, eyeing the dishes even more hungrily. “Good,” he said. 
“Now you know what philosophy is all about.”
 * Salvino Busuttil (b. 1936) studied philosophy at the Gregorian University in Rome, Italy, 
acquiring a licentiate in 1959, and at the Angelicum University in Rome whence he acquired a 
Doctorate in Philosophy in 1961 with a dissertation entitled Value in Karl Marx. In 1963 he 
earned a Doctorate in Economy from the University of Manchester. After returning to Malta 
Busuttil was appointed Professor and Head of the Department of Economics at the University 
of Malta in 1964, an office he held up till 1975. Two years later, in 1966, he was chosen as Head 
of the Faculty of Arts until 1972.
  From 1987 till 1996 Busuttil was General Director of the Foundation of International 
Studies at the University of Malta. Both on a local as well as on an international level he occupied 
various positions of responsibility related to the economy and the environment, especially with 
UNESCO.
 ‡ This paper was read during the academic celebrations in honour of St. Thomas Aquinas, held 
at the University Theatre on March 8th, 1965.
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This somewhat crude introduction to philosophy savoured more of a 
prolegomenon to the Nihilism of Nietzsche than to the realism of Aquinas. I 
cannot imagine Aquinas being satisfied merely with the idea of food-dishes on 
a table. If we are to believe his biographers, the Angelic Doctor was enough of a 
realist and a gourmet to appreciate that man, although not living by bread alone, 
also lived by bread.
Aquinas was a realistic philosopher. Now a realistic economist is one who in 
showing men how to live by bread, keeps in mind that they do not live by bread 
alone. And it is the purpose of my paper this evening to relate the judgement 
on moral value to the judgement on economic value with special reference to a 
developing economy.
In assessing the relationship between ethics and economics, one has, in the 
first place, to distinguish between the two ends of these respective sciences. Ethics 
concerns the rightness or wrongness of all human acts in terms of man’s nature as 
a rational being created to God’s image and likeness. In so far as economic events 
are determined by man, then we can pass judgement on them concerning their 
value as human acts. Economic man is man, and no automaton; economic acts 
have consequently a moral value.
I stress this principle because it is considered old-fashioned by many economists 
who forget that antiques have become fashionable and economically valuable 
because they have an enduring beauty. And I lay special emphasis on it because 
development economists have the habit of tendering advice which often ignores 
the fact that man’s material welfare is not synonymous with man’s happiness.
Not that such economists do not themselves philosophize and pass value 
judgements. But rather, some of them assume that man is only rational when 
he is materialistic, and that to look at things spiritually, that is in a way that 
transcends matter, is irrational - forgetting, of course, that rationality is a faculty 
of the spirit (unless you have too much of it).
In fact many economic thinkers tend to base their principles on moral 
foundations. On one side, we have the Marxist school which claims that it is the 
State that determines the criterion of value, even though, of course, moral value as 
such has no meaning for a Marxist. On the other side, we have an increasing mass 
of economic thinkers who believe that it is the individual who establishes the 
ethical value of human acts. Both these schools of economic thought have many 
adherents today - the vogue today is to be an existential or agnostic economist, 
a vogue that in the Marxist case, had its source in Hegel, and in the school of 
economic individualism, in Adam Smith. It is pertinent to remember that Marx 
graduated in philosophy (wine-drinker that he was, his thesis was on Epicurus), 
and that Adam Smith was a professor of logic.
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There is a third school of economic thought which is a happy medium 
between the two to which I have just alluded. It is characteristic of this school 
to lay stress on man’s complex nature as a rational being, and as an individual, 
bestowed with the dignity of manhood, who is also a social animal; as living in 
society but transcending it because of the innate glory of his soul.
Aristotle himself, though obscurely because of his pagan background, 
recognized the cogency of this outlook on man in his economic life. But it was 
Aquinas, in medieval times, and the great Popes of the last seventy years, from 
Leo XIII to Paul VI, happily reigning, who have set down clearly and forcefully 
the relationship between morality and economic growth. And it was perhaps 
Pius XI in Quadragesimo Anno who synthetized the intimate correlation between 
economic and moral values.
“Though economic science and moral discipline,” he writes, “are guided each 
by its own principles in its own sphere, it is false to say that the two orders are so 
distinct and alien that the former (that is economics) in no way depends on the 
latter (that is ethics). The so-called laws of economics derived from the nature 
of earthly goods and from the qualities of the human body and soul, determine 
what aims are unattainable and attainable in economic matters, and what means 
are thereby rendered necessary; while reason itself clearly deduces from the 
nature of things and from the individual and social character of man, what is the 
end and object of the whole economic order assigned by God the Creator.”
And further on, in the same Encyclical, he reiterates the same teaching that 
“the economic and social organism will attain its end when it secures for all and 
each goods […] sufficient to supply all needs and an honest livelihood, and to 
uplift men to that higher level of prosperity and culture which, provided it be 
used with prudence, is […] of singular help to virtue.”
These principles have particular relevance to economic development. 
When an economist analyses a country or a region or a situation, he often has 
to determine the relationship between “what is” and “what is to be,” and to do 
so he must pass judgements on “what should be” and “why it should be.” The 
student of economic development has to study the relationships between data 
and their dependent variables. The former imply facts concerning population, 
consumption patterns, natural resources, factors of production, monetary and 
fiscal policies and the nature and extent of competition on the market. The latter, 
the variables, concern the prices of goods and services, the prices of the factors 
of production, the allocation of resources to the productive sectors, and the 
distribution of final products among the producers.
To assess what should be all in all the relationships between the data and the 
variables which I have just mentioned would call for a comprehensive judgement 
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which is usually outside the scope of the development economist. In working 
out a development plan or in building a development theory, the economist 
normally uses only the more salient data. He analyses those which have 
immediate pertinence to his theory or to his plan, and excludes the influence 
of psychological and sociological factors. This may sometimes result in plans 
and theories which are economically sound but which are socially unacceptable, 
and the postulates of theories and the assumptions of development plans are 
often sociological generalizations bereft of objectivity. The classical theorists of 
economic growth have themselves not been immune from this tendency. The 
classical case, in the literal sense, is the great Marxian postulate that “in every 
historical epoch the prevailing mode of economic production and exchange, and 
the social organization necessarily flowing from it, form the basis upon which is 
built up, and from which alone can be explained, the political and -intellectual 
history of that epoch.”
From this crude and unrealistic generalization, Marxism has derived its 
primary dogma of the decline of capitalism and the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
From it, too, the Marxists have derived their criterion of moral value as being 
determined by economic events, interpreted by that Norm of Moral Value which 
is the State. But the difficulties between ethical and economic judgements are 
not confined to ideologies, but concern the very concept of economic life.
Thus one of the fundamental moral judgements in economic development 
relates to the distinction between the “economic sphere” and the “milieu” or “the 
surrounding world.”
Classical economists argued that man’s economic behaviour was a 
manifestation of man’s rational self-interest. Marx went further to reduce all 
human acts to forms of economic behaviour. And a more recent development 
theorist like Schumpeter has held that the criterion of man’s economic behaviour 
is his “conduct directed towards the acquisition of goods.” Schumpeter and 
many contemporary theorists of growth believe that the economist is limited 
exclusively to economic behaviour, and that moral and sociological considerations 
are outside the economist’s terms of reference.
To avoid a conflict between the two spheres, the economist has to bear in mind 
that economic development principles are subject in their application to moral 
law. This criterion must be borne in mind when the development economist is 
selecting the data for his plans. 
One of the most important moral judgements on data that the development 
economist has to make concerns the population, its tastes, attitudes and 
dispositions, and its social institutions. The classical theorists, in accepting the 
Malthusian theory of population, were postulating the concept of an optimum 
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population. In a developing economy, where present resources are being 
exhausted, and where new resources are being tapped to derive new production, 
where new capital is being invested and accumulated, and where social attitudes 
are changing, there is little reason to believe that the population will remain 
stationary. Now the classical economists based their concept of an optimum 
population in a growing economy on three principal assumptions:
• the existence of one single satisfactory index of the relationship between 
population and national welfare; 
• secondly, the principle of the division of labour;
• thirdly, the law of diminishing returns.
These assumptions provide a good example of the issues to be tackled by the 
development economist in so far as ethics is concerned. The last two assumptions 
are obviously economic ones and pertain purely to economics. But the first 
postulate raises an important moral question. Can an optimum relationship 
between population and national welfare be measured by one criterion? Can 
one say that decisions affecting national economic policy should be determined 
solely by per capita real income, by per capita consumption or by per capita real 
wages? If one were to exclude a moral judgement, and consider man as a purely 
economic animal, the answer would be yes. But if we regard man as a being 
endowed with a spiritual dignity, we have to admit that we cannot advocate, 
such a single criterion, because per capita national income may be rising, while 
sectors of the population may, due to changes in the economic structure of the 
country be undergoing hardship.
Because of ethical reasons, neither can one advocate an economic policy 
which the planners may say “in the long run” will lead to a higher standard of 
living though it will inflict some hardship in the short run. One cannot condemn 
a present generation to real hardship so that a future generation may enjoy more 
of the good things of life; nor can one, for economic reasons, wring injustice on 
one sector of the population so that another sector can be better off. It is useful 
to remember the saying of the great economist, Lord Keynes, that “in the long 
run we are all dead.”
Again, one of the major principles of economic analysis enunciates that as 
income increases, consumption increases, but not proportionately. Here again, 
it is the task of economic science to determine whether the data concerning the 
various aggregates of consumption are valid; but it is the task of moral science 
to determine who is responsible for the changes in the change of taste among 
consumers. It is the task of ethics to determine whether the targets placed before 
consumers as an incentive towards economic development are morally right 
or not. It is part of the science of ethics to ascertain whether the images with 
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which advertising baits the consumer are acceptable. And the relevance of a 
moral judgement pertains too to the problem of whether consumption should 
be constantly expanded at the expense of savings.
Closely related to the behaviour of people as consumers, is their attitude 
toward social organization and social institutions in so far as they are economic 
citizens. Classical economists believed that the market was a great instrument of 
social cohesion. Their concept of justice was limited to the act of exchange in a 
free market. In their view, narrowing the freedom of the market would weaken 
the automatic power of the market to bring about economic adjustments, and 
that such a weakening would affect adversely the progress of the nation. Many 
Marxist theorists, rejecting the social injustice inherent in the classical position, 
went to the other extreme and believed that true economic development was 
only attainable through a completely planned economy where the individual was 
subordinated to the State.
The role of social institutions in economic development raises far more 
problems than we can tackle here. It seems to me that the ethical norm to be used 
in determining this role is that social institutions in a developing country should 
help men as individuals in the first place, and in the second place, as members of 
society.
This last aspect brings up the crucial problem of social justice in a developing 
economy. If a development plan is to be morally acceptable, it must be permeated 
with a spirit of justice. Justice implies balance, a balance between the productive 
sectors in so far as men are producers, a balance in the sacrifices to be borne by the 
different groups of the community, a balance in the prospects and opportunities 
and incentives offered to each individual in the community.
And social justice in developing planning and in the execution of plans for 
a developing country implies balance in the respective moral responsibilities 
of the entrepreneur, the consumer and the state; in the relationship between 
population and the labour force; in the division of labour. It implies that there 
be Christian attitudes towards work and towards leisure.
It ordains that the costs and the sacrifices of economic development be shared 
equally by all; and that there exists a right hierarchy of values implicit in the goals 
of economic development, goals that concern abundance, opportunity, security 
and freedom in relation to the ultimate goal of happiness in enjoying the good 
things of life because they are God’s things.
For economic development should ultimately help men to reach more 
smoothly and more cheerfully the riches, the abundance and the freedom of the 
City of God.
